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BRIEF SUMMARIZING STATEMENT 
The question before the Court in this case is 
whether the conveyance from the commissioner of the 
Court to the appellant is to be set aside. The ap-
pellees' petition and cross-bill was filed more than 
one year after the sale to the appellant was confirmed. 
Section 6306 of the Code is as follows: · 
''If a sale of property be made under 
a decree or order of a court, and such sale 
be confirmed, the title of the purchaser at 
such sale shall not be disturbed unless 
within twelve months from such con-
firmation, the sale be set aside by the 
trial court or an appeal be allowed by 
the Supreme Court -of Appeals, and an 
order or decree be therein afterwards en-
tered requiring such sale to .be set aside, 
but there may be restitution of the pro-
ceeds of sale to those entitled." 
We may concede that the above has no appli-
cation to a decree of sale where the Court is without 
jurisdiction. Brenham v. Smith, 120 Va. 30. The 
decree in such cases is void, and life cannot be infused 
into it by the lapse of time. 
But, if the Circuit Court did have jurisdiction, 
it was manifest error to set aside the sale. The ap-
pellees, if they had proved they were entitled to any 
relief, would have been confined to restitution of the 
amount they proved they were entitled to. 
The record shows the case was heard on bill and 
answer, the latter denying the course of descent. No-
where in the record is there any proof that Catherine 
Sidney Abingdon ·married Richard Zigler or that she 
was the mother of Mary Zigler or of the other children 
of Richard Zigler. · The appellees contend that ap-
pellant's counsel, R. E. Woolwine, admitted to the 
judge of the Circuit Court that this relationship 
existed, and that the Court was misled thereby. It 
i~ not even contended, however, that opposing_ counsel 
were so misl~d, and Mr. Woolwine has an entirely 
different recollection of the conversation between him 
and the judge. There(ore, as the appellants have 
failed to prove any rights in the matter _whatsoever, 
their petition and cross-bill should be dismissed. 
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
The Circuit Court had Jurisdiction to sell the land. 
The eQtire argument of counsel for appellees is 
based upon the assumption that the order of publication 
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in this case was not sufficient to give the Court juris-
diction to sell the land here involved. If their con-
tention were sound, it would absolutely destroy the 
efficacy· of judicial sales in cases which frequently arise 
where th~re are a large number of unknown heirs. 
The appellees claim Mary Zigler was the last 
surviving child of Richard Zigler and that she died in-
testate and without issue; they claim that Mary Zigler 
inherited the land by virtue of being the daughter of 
said Richard Zigler. They admit that the order of 
publication was properly directed to all the unknown 
heirs of said Richard Zigler. They do not dispute that 
the land books for many years taxed the property as 
belonging to Christopher Zigler. He was Richard's 
father. They do not deny that, so far as the records 
of deeds and wills show, Mary Zigler never owned the 
property; she, it is claimed, acquired it by inheritance 
without any record evidence thereof. It is not denied 
that the order of publication was properly directed 
against all the unknown heirs of the last record owners 
of the property. Nor is it disputed that the trial court 
solemnly decreed that this order of publication was 
sufficient as against aU unknown parties in interest, 
as disclosed by the bill. The appellees claim as. col-
lateral kindred of Richard Zigler through his alleged 
daughter and wife. 
We have cited in our petition authority for the 
proposition that "The term 'unknown heirs' means all 
kind of heirs of such defendants, including heirs of 
heirs of such defendants, as well as legatees of heirs' ". 
Mary Zigler, if she was the legitimate daughter of 
Richard Zigler, was certainly an heir of those whose 
names were set out in the order of publication. This 
is not disputed. If the rule above quoted· is sound, then 
all her heirs are necessarily embraced therein, and 
appellees claim as her heirs, that is, as heirs of the 
heir of Richard, Leonard and· Chr:istopher Zigler, all 
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of whose heirs were expressly included in the order of 
publication. 
The rule quoted is sound beyond question. 
Nor could any case afford a better illustration for the 
necessity of the rule than the one now before this Court. 
The order of publication published on appellees' cross-
bill, (Record, pp. 84-86, incl.), set.s out the names of 
fifty-eight persons whose whereabouts are unknown, 
and also the unknown heirs of twenty-five other 
designated deceased persons, whose names and where-
abouts are unknown. Now it would be almost a 
miracle, if some of these innumerable supposed persons 
or their heirs have not already died intestate and with-
out issue, leaving maternal ki1;1dred as lieirs. And 
yet, if opposing counsel are correct in their contention, 
a second sale of this land could be again set aside, at 
least in part, by some such persons filing petitions and 
claiming the second order of publication was not broad 
enough to embrace them. 
Substantially every state in the Union has found 
it necessary to enact legislation pe.rmitt,ing proceedings 
of this nature by .Publication against unknown heirs. 
It is an obvious necessity to prevent the lands of the 
state becoming overburdened with clouds on titles which 
c~u.ld never be otherwise .removed than through 
judicial sales. ·unless the purchasers at such sales 
could feel assurance that "heirs of heirs" are embraced 
in the process, no one could be found who would pay a 
fair price for the property; for he would be forever in 
danger of having his title upset by such "heirs of heirs". 
The rule is a rule of reason as well as of necessity. 
But opposing counsel, while conceding the rule 
as to "lineal descendants", assert that it does not· apply 
to collateral kindred, and say that an examination of our 
authorities 14will so show". This we deny.· Ruling' 
Case Law says even "legatees" of unknown heirs come 
within such publications. There is no distinction, 
either in reason or authority, between lineal and col-
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lateral heirs. The same rule which makes necessary 
proceedings of this nature by publication of process 
against lineal heirs requires that it apply to all persons, 
so that stability of land titles may be effected. Opposing 
counsel have been able to fi~d no authority in support 
of their alleged distinction between lineal and collateral 
heirs, nor does it have at:J.y foundation in reason or 
principle. See the case of Goins v. Garber, 131 Va., 59. 
The opposing brief seeks to split up the land 
into divisions, as though separate and distinct types of 
claim were applicable as between maternal and paternal 
heirs. While Section 6254 of the Code defines the mea-
sure of the interest which the various kindred take, yet 
they all take as common heirs of the decec;lent, though in 
varying proportions. If Mary Zigler was the last 
surviving sole owner of the land, all of her unknown 
heirs are before the Court, or else none of them are. 
The particular type, kind or degree of relationship, 
whether paternal or maternal, cannot affect · the 
question. . All of them, being heirs of the heir of Rich~rd 
Zigler, are clearly included in the order of publication 
and were before the Court when the appellant bought 
the land. 
On page 5 of the opposing brief, the contention 
is made that, although the object of the suit as set out 
in the order of publication describes the tracts of land 
to be sold and the magisterial district in which located, 
yet because the purpose is said to b~ to sell th.e lands 
Christopher Zigler died seized of, this is not sufficient~ 
This contention is highly technical. . The order of pq.b-
lication, (Record, pp.. 71-72), says "an affidavit having 
been made and filed in the clerk's office that the defend-
ants x x x the other heirs at law of Leonard Zigler, dec'd, 
whose names, ages and residences unknown, x x x , the 
o~her heirs at law of Christopher Zigler, dec'd, whose 
names, ages and re.sidences unknown, the .heirs of 
Richard Zigler, whose names, ages and residences un~ 
kriown, x x x, it is ordered that they do appear here x x x 
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and do what may be necessary to protect their interest 
in this suit." And the publication says further, "The 
object of this suit i~ to sell all the real estate Christopher 
Zigler owned at the time of his death and distribute the 
net proceeds of the sale among the heirs according to 
law". Thus the heirs of these various persons are des-
ignated as the heirs whose interests are a.ffected. Tak-
en as a whole the order of publication further shows that 
the heirs of Christopher Zigler are also the heirs of 
Richard Zigler and Leonard Zigler and that all of them 
are co-owners whose rights are involved. Now the 
appellees all claim to be "heirs of the heir" of Richard 
Zigler and Leonard Zigler. The bill alleges the land 
stands on the land books in the name of Christopher 
Zigler, and this is not denied, and is record evidence of 
the general reputation of the ownership thereof for pur-
poses of identification and description. The bill further 
states the land is owned by the heirs of Christopher 
Zigler, Leonard Zigler and Richard Zigler, and further 
that upon the death of Christopher Zigler, Richard and 
Leonard inherited same. · 
In other words, though there is a difference of 
opinion expressed in the bill from that in the appellees' 
petition as to the means by which Richard and Leonard 
derived title, whether by inheritance or by deed, there 
is no disagreement as to the fact that when they died 
they held the title to these lands. The report of the 
Commissioner shows that the said tracts were charged 
to Christopher Zigler for taxation. See record, Page 
28. The report was confirmed by a decree of the Cir-
cuit Court, at the June Term, 1928, (record, page 29.) 
Code Section 2451 makes it mandatory_ on the 
"owner of real estate to cause it to be entered on the 
land books." Section 2273 makes it mandatory on the 
''Commissioner to show the land books to the owner or 
agent and swear him as to the correc~ness of the entry of 
his land, to verify entries and make proper correction." 
The fact that the 18 3/4 acres and the .282 acres of land 
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were charged in the name of Christopher Zigler for tax-
ation at the time of the institution of the suit in chan-
cery of Eliza Plasters et als v. Lent Zigler et als, and for 
more than forty years prior thereto, is forceful evidence 
that Christopher Zigler was the owner. 
The order of publication, being against the heirs 
of all three last record owners of the land clearly indi-
cates their heirs, (or "heirs of heirs" by legal interpre-
tation), as those whose lands are being sold. It is ap-
parent from the allegations of the original bill that the 
complainants therein were not aware who was the last 
living owner of the land. Nor. does the bill allege that 
Richard Zigler ever married. So far as was apparently 
known to the complainants therein, his children may 
have been illegitimate, or if legitimate, may have died 
in infancy, in which case appellees, claiming as maternal 
heirs would have no interest in the prpperty. Nor is 
there any proof in the record now to show they were 
adults at the time of their death. The name of the 
mother was apparently unknown to them. 
Opposing counsel do not dispute that Christo-
pher Zigler owned the 18~ acre tract at the time of his 
death, or that he owned, at the very least, an undivided 
one-third interest in the 282 acre tract, and that as to 
this part of the land sold the object of the suit, as ex-
pressed in the order of publication, is unquestionably 
correct. Their claim is as to the other two-thirds inter-
est in the 282 acre tract; that, although same appears on 
the land books in the name of Christopher Zigler, the 
deed books do not disclose that he acquired it from his 
·sons. This is a highly technical objection. The tract 
of land in question is clearly described and identified. 
Christopher Zigler owned either a part of all of it,-the 
land books indicating all, the deed books a part. The 
·order of publication shows the entire tract is to be sold. 
The rights of the parties are identical, whether Christo-
pher Zigler once owned it all or not, as the same persons 
inherit in either case. Mary Zigler, if she was the last 
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surviving legitimate child of Richard, inherited same, 
'Yhether C·hristopher owned it all or an un~ivided. inter.:. 
est therein. ·Clearly all th~ appellees were charged with 
notice by the order of publication that their lands were 
to be sold. A technical objection as to the ancient 
ownership or chain of title, not affecting the ultimate 
rights of anyone, cannot affect the jurisdiction of the 
court, as all these parties were undoubtedly embraced i'n 
the order of publication. 
All that is required to constitute due process is 
that the statute be substantially <;om plied with and that 
an interested person, reading the entire notice as pub-
lished would be informed that his interests would be 
affected by the suit. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 
34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 779. 
In the case at bar the heirs of Richard Zigler and 
the heirs of Mary Zigler, (if she were his legitimate 
child), are identical, as the e~tire rights passed through 
Richard. Any such p~rson reading the notice and cog-
nizant of the facts concerning his family relationship 
and the laws of inheritance applicable thereto, would 
necessarily know he had an interest in the lands to be 
sold, and that his rights were being litigated in the suit. 
But even, if this Court should be of opinion that, 
as an original proposition, the order of publication is 
defe~tive, the record shows that the Circuit Court's de-
cree, entered before appellant purchased the land, de-
clared that the order of publication was properly exe-
cuted against all resident as well as non-resident defen-
dants. The memorandum of the suit, as well as the 
original bill, set out the heirs of Mary Zigler as parties 
defendant having an interest in the property. This de-
cree of the Court was therefore a judicial determination 
that Mary Zigler's heirs were included in the ''heirs'' of 
Richard, Chri~topher· and Leonard Zigler, under the 
rule that "heirs of heirs" are included. 
The.appellant·here is an innocent third party and 
tl:te solemn adjudication in tl)e decree of the Court that 
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procesS. against Mary Zigler's heirs had been duly exe-
cuted, is conclusive to protect his title, and cannot be 
contradicted by bringing in a copy of the order of pub-
lication. In Wilcher v. Robertson, 78 Va. 616, involv-
ing the validity of a judicial sale based on process by 
publication against a defendant, who was dead at the 
time. this Court said: 
"On the other hand, if it be a judg-
ment or decree of a court of general juris-
diction, and the record declares that no-
tice has been given, such declaration can-
not be contradicted by extraneous proof. 
In such cases the judgment or decree is 
sustained, not because a judgment render-
ed without notice is good, but because the 
law does not permit the introduction of 
evidence to overthrow that which, for rea..: 
sons of public policy, it treats as absolute 
verity. The record is, conclusively, pre-
sumed to speak the truth, and can be tried 
only by inspection. This results from the 
power of the court to pass upon every 
question which arises in the cause, includ-
ing the facts necessary to the eXercise of 
its jurisdiction, and as to which, therefore, 
its judgment, unless obtained by fraud or 
collusion, is binding, until reversed, on 
every other court. And especially is this 
so, in respect to decrees under which sales 
are made to bona fide purchasers. If it 
were otherwise-if purchasers could be 
held responsible for the errors of the court, 
or could be required to look beyond the 
proceedings in the cause to find authority 
for the court to act, then such sales, as has 
well been said, would be but snares for 
honest men." 
In Morrow v. Brinkley, 85 Va., 60, after quoting 
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the foregoing with approval, the court continued: 
uThe appellees are innocent third 
.Parties not concerned in the litigation be-· 
fore the court, and who became purchas-
ers by the invitation of the court; and the 
evidence of the appearance of the heirs of 
Parker West is the recital in the court's 
decree ~f the fact solemnly alleged there-
by, that these heirs, the appellants, were 
before the court." 
: 
The attention of the Court is again invited to the 
authorities to the same effect cited in the petition for 
appeal, (Record, p. 6). The sufficiency of the process 
against all defendants to the original bill, which includ-
ed Mary Zigler's heirs, cannot now be questioned as 
against the appellant. 
It is claimed on page 7 of the opposing. brief·that 
"even if the maternal kindred of Mary Zigler were par-
ties to the suit under this order of publication x x x 
they had a perfect right to appear x x x and have any 
injustice in the proceedings corrected." This is true 
to a limited extent. Under the provisions of Section 
6306 of the Code they could have a decree for restitution 
against any person who may have received money to 
which they were entitled, but as twelve months had 
elapsed since the sale, the court was without power to 
disturb it. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that 
the order of publication was amply sufficient to give the 
Court jurisdiction of the land sold and conveyed by its 
commissioners to the appellant, and as no complaint, 
other than want of jurisdiction, has been or can be 
made to the decrees authorizing and confirming the 
conveyance to the appellant, it was error for the Circuit 
Court to set aside said conveyance. The petition and 
cross-bill attacking appellant's deed were not filed 
until more than twelve months after the sale. to ap-
pellant was confirmed, and said sale cannot n~w be 
disturbed. 
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OTHER ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
While it is believed that it Will not be nec-
essary for the Court to consider any of the remaining 
assignments, except the sixth, we will nevertheless dis-
cuss them briefly. 
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
This assignment is to th~ effect that even, if 
the Circuit Court had been correct in its holding that 
all parties in interest were not included in the order 
of publication executed on the original bill, yet it was 
clearly erroneous to decree a resale of these lands on the 
second order of publication which was had on the ap-
pellees' petition and cross-bill. The reason we assigned 
is that such publication .was had and completed before 
leave of court was granted to file such petition and 
cross-bill, and that as the process against these in-
numerable unknown parties was, for this reason void, 
such process could not be afterwards validated by the 
nunc pro tunc provision contained in the final decree 
granting such leave of court. No application had been 
made to the Court for leave to file the petition and cross-
bill, and the Court had no power to grant the leave 
nunc pro tunc. In Duncan v. Carson, 1927 Va., 311, 
the Court said "The object of a nunc pro tunc order 
is to make the record show something which actually 
took place at a former day of Court. It is not to 
permit something to be done which was omitted by 
oversight or otherwise." 
Opposing counsel reply that the appellant has 
app~red and answered and ~hus waived the objection. 
But appellant first moved the Court to dismiss the pe-
tition on this ground. And even, if waived as to ap-
pellant, it was certainly not waived by the unknown 
parties. If they were not properly in Court, the re-
sale would be void as to them. The land was ordered 
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to be sold as a whole. The appellees admit appellant 
owned at least a one-fourth interest therein. Even if 
he had· no other interest than this, he ··might desire to 
purchase to protect same, and would be clearly pre}.; 
udiced by any irregularity which would affect the 
validity of the resale. 
The ·nunc pro tunc decree could not validate a 
void. process, and a decree of sale based on such process 
as to the unknown parties who did not appear is clearly 
erroneous. 
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
The ol)ly answer to this assignment which op-
posing counsel have made, which calls for a reply, is 
that appellant's counsel, R. E. Woolwine, admitted the 
. correctness of the alleged "course of descent." We will 
discuss this later in connection with another assignment. 
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
This assignment .is that the Court erred in not 
referring the case to a commissioner in chancery. It is 
a well established principle in judicial sales in Virginia 
that the respective interests involved in land to be sold 
be fixed and determined -prior to sale, so that the parties 
may, by intelligent bidding, protect their interests. 
While this is largely·a matterfor the discretion of the 
Court, ·where the interests are involved and complicated 
as in this case, it was clearly an abuse of discretion not 
to do so. Thompson v. Davidson, 76 Va., 338. 
Furthermore, the appellant is conceded to be 
the owner of at least an undivided one-fourth interest 
in the land, and it should have been determined whether 
his interest could be set aside to him by partition in 
kind. Appellant was not consenting to the sale, and it 
was. error to sell his conceded interest, if it was sus.:. 
ceptible of partition in kind. Roberts· v. Hagan; 121 
·va., 573. 
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FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
The decree appealed from ·gave the appellant the 
privilege of retaining title to the land, if he so de-:-
sired, upon repayment of three-fourths of the purchase 
money. This money the c;lecree directs be paid in its en-· 
tirety · to the attorneys for the appellees, although they 
do not p~rport to represent the innumerable unknown 
defendants, wh~, appellees claim, have. an interest in the 
· property. Appellant's contention is that, if· the sale 
was to be reconfirmed to appellant, and, if he were to be 
required to make restitution to anyone, certainly he 
should be required to pay only those persons who come 
into the suit and prove their right thereto; and that, so 
far as possible, if appellant should be compelled to lose 
through having paid the court's officer, his loss, upon 
p~~nc~ples of equity, should be reduced as far as possible, 
by giving him the benefit of unclaimed shares. This, it 
is submitted, is a sound principle of equity, and if the 
Court had been right in other respects, should have been 
applied. 
As to the contention of opposing counsel that 
appellant has no claim to the fund and it is immaterial 
to him where it goes, it may be replied that their clients 
could have no claim to more than their respective shares 
and it is immaterial to them where the balance goes, 
and if appellant had been protected, sofar as possible, 
in his transactions with the Court, they would not 
have been hurt. 
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
This assignment is to the .failure of the Court 
to ent~r a final decree for the defendants to the petition 
and cross-bill, because of the failure ofappell~es to pro~ 
duce any evidence hi support of.the~r allegations· of re~ 
lationship to the decedents. who Qwp.ed the. land ;in 
question, such relationship having been denied ·in the 
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answers. Opposing counsel practically · concede the 
correctness of our position on this assignment, and in 
an effort to extricate themselves have filed an affidavit 
·of the judge of the Circuit Court that Mr. Woolwine, 
who represented appellant, stated to him privately in 
his office that there was ''no denial of the kinship of the 
parties as set forth in the petition and cross-bill." It 
is quite embarrassing to have to question the justifi-
cation of the judge below in reaching this conclusion. 
Mr. Woolwine has, however, given his affifavit that he 
did not so understand the conversation. He understood 
the judge's inquiry was directed to the question of 
whether he desired to introduce evidence on the sub-
ject, as he had suggested he might desire to do on the 
evening before. It is, at most, clearly a case of mis-
understanding, and its occurrence is to be much re-
gretted. 
But, however, that may be, there is no inti-
mation that counsel for appellee were misled, or that 
they ever heard of any such statement, or that same was 
made to them or in their presence. After all, the judge 
has no personal.interest in this ca~e, and it is no re-
flection upon his ability that opposing counsel did not 
or could not prove their case before having a final de-
cree entered. 
This Court is clearly confined to the record 
before it, and cannot look to affidavits to prove that 
the decree was a consent one. The decree appealed 
from shows on its face that it was suspended to allow 
time for an appeal, negativing the idea that anything 
was consented to. If opposing counsel considered the 
decree based on an admission, a provision to this 
effect should have been incorporated in the decree. 
Mr. Woolwine would then have had opportunity to 
make his objection thereto. . 
Furthermore, the record shows (p.· 14) that a 
copy of the petition for appeal was delivered to ·each of 
opposing counsel on the 9th day of July, 1930, fourteen 
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days before the same was presented to one of the judges 
of this Court. Under Rule II (a) of this Court opposing 
co~nsel had ten days within which to file a reply thereto 
in writing. If they desired to raise this question, it 
should have been raised and the affidavit filed before 
allowance of the appeal. No such thought seems to 
have occurred to them at that time, however, and they 
evidently had never heard of the conversation between 
Mr. Woolwine and the judge. 
The Court can look only to the record to deter-
mine the nature of a decree. Its character cannot be 
changed by depositions. Morris v. Green 29 W. Va. 
201, 11 S. E. 954. In Bank of Gauley v. Osenton 
114 S. E. 437 this was said: "It is argued that the 
affidavits show that the order was entered by consent. 
They cannot be received for that purpose." 
And in the case of Denny v. Searles 150 Va. 
730, where the decree stated on its face that the parties 
assented thereto, this was said to be conclusive, and 
the attorney for one of the parties, who had not endorsed 
the decree, was not permitted to question it. 
See also to the same effect Shinn v. Shinn 142 
S. E. 64. 
In Paris v. Brown 143 Va. 897, it is said: 
"Statements de hors the record have 
been filed by counsel for both parties,· 
purporting to detail certain incidents in 
connection with the trial of the case and 
the perfecting of the record prior to the 
application for a writ of error. The recol~ 
lections of counsel appear to be at variance 
in several particulars, as is to be expected 
when opposing counsel attempt to give 
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their versions of the happenings in con-
nection with the litigation. We think 
the wisdom· of disallowing all such at-
temptsto add to, or take from, the record 
is well illustrated in this case." 
While the misunderstanding in the case at l;>ar 
arose between the trial judge and one of the counsel, it 
"involves not so much what was said between them, as 
the interpretation thereof. Mr. Woolwine is clear 
that he did not intend to admit any facts denied in the 
answer. If such an admission had been placed in the 
decree, he would have had an opportunity to correct it. 
It is exceedingly embarrassing to an attorney to be 
placed in a position of this kind, and the rule above 
quoted, as to the verity of the record, repeatedly 
announced by .this Court, and the courts of the states 
generally, is the only wise and safe practice to follow. 
Ruling Case Law, Vol. 2, p. 153 states the general rule 
as follows: 
"It is a well settled rule of appellate 
procedure that all questions must be 
tried and determined by the . record as 
certified to the appellate court. The rec-
ord imports absolute verity and resort 
cannot be had to anything de hors the 
record' for the purpose of contradicting it. 
Thus evidence outside the transcript is 
inadmissible to show that a motion stated · 
therein to have been made by one of the 
parties was in fact made by the other." 
As before stated, there is no suggestion, either 
in the record or the affidavit, that any admission was 
made' to or in the presence of opposing counsel, or that 
they had any knowledge of it. If they had relied on an 
oral admission, their motion to file the affidavit would 
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have been made promptly qefore the appeal was al-
lowed. · Clearly they had not heard of any such thing. 
They elected to go to trial on. bill and answer, and must 
abide the result. They themselves are seeking to take 
advantage of a tecJtnical- omission of the clerk in not 
including Mary Zigler's heirs, by name, in the order of 
publication, and are in no position to complain,- if the 
case goes against them for failure to produce the 
necessary proof of their case.. Fortunately, the clerk's 
omission was immaterial, as the heirs of her father were 
included, but they themselves were relying on a techni-
c~lity to disturb the sale made by the Court to an 
innocent purchaser who had paid his money in good 
faith. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted, in conclusion, 
(a) That the original order of publication was 
adequate to confer upon the Court jurisdiction to 
sell the land: 
(b) That more t~an twelve months having 
elapsed since the sale was confirmed, the Circuit Court 
was without power to disturb the conveyance to the 
appellant; and 
(c) That, the appellees, having submitted their 
case on their petition and cross-bill and the various 
answers thereto, without proof of relationship to the 
deceased owners of the land, their s~id petition and 
cross-bill should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ABRAM. P. STAPLES 
Of Counsel for Appella,nt. 
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